This paper presents the first analysis of transfer pricing strategies, employing a simulated proxy for the company's marginal tax rate. Application of this sophisticated tax measure allows us to perform a direct comparison of profit shifting to subsidiaries with low statutory tax rates and to subsidiaries with tax losses. Using a panel of 23,668 EU subsidiaries of foreign companies, we observe that the shift-to-loss effect is significant and that its size (marginal effect: -.193) does not differ considerably from the size of shifting to low tax rates (marginal effect: -.182). Our findings further indicate that the shift-to-loss effect influences profit shifting only in the short term and that profits are shifted in particular to subsidiaries, whose loss carryforwards are expected to expire in the near future.
Introduction
In the past two decades, our understanding of mechanisms and incentives for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to engage in international tax arbitrage improved remarkably. Exploiting subsidiary-level data, empirical studies provide evidence for the effect of international tax rate differentials on the reported profitability of subsidiaries (e.g., , allocation of intangible property within a multinational group (e.g., Dischinger & Riedel, 2011) , and intra-group financing (e.g., Huizinga, Laeven & Nicodeme, 2008) . The cited studies use differences in host countries' statutory tax rates to compute the potential benefit, arising from a tax-efficient allocation of income or underlying assets within the MNE. 1 The general idea is that, by shifting income from high-tax to low-tax countries through debt shifting, transfer pricing, and licensing strategies, a multinational company can considerably reduce its overall tax payments.
However, by focusing on statutory tax rate differentials, the cited studies ignore the aspect that for subsidiaries near exhaustion, due to low profitability, of accrued nondebt tax shields or tax loss carryforwards, the marginal tax rate on an additional dollar of income can fall considerably short of the statutory profit tax rate. As a consequence, the incentive to shift income out of a high tax country depends strongly on the subsidiary's actual tax status -and might even be reversed. Specifically, in view of limited or otherwise risky loss carryforwards, MNEs may seek to immediately offset subsidiary losses against profits earned in other parts of the group. As most countries do not allow cross-border loss offsets, shift-to-loss strategies might thus become attractive.
An MNE has several possibilities for shifting income from one country to another to make use of net operating losses (NOL). The strategy employed is highly dependent on the size of a NOL carryforward, the time horizon and the associated costs of shifting.
One strategy for a loss-making subsidiary would be to enter into a sale-and-leaseback transaction with a profitable subsidiary. This transaction is relatively easy to arrange and allows two means of short-term profit shifting: first, an immediate accounting gain is generated by the sale to a higher-tax subsidiary. Second, during the contract period, a tax benefit can be realised by paying an artificially lowered bargain rental rate to the lessor (Scholes et al 2015) .
It is only recently that studies of income shifting to loss-making subsidiaries began to appear. Hopland, Lisowsky, Mardan and Schindler. (forthcoming) present a theoretical model of income shifting under losses. Moreover, they empirically analyse the shift-toloss behaviour using data on cross-border payments and capital structures of Norwegian firms. Their model consistently predicts that to maximise the MNE's after-tax profit, lossmaking subsidiaries should report lower losses than purely domestic firms, just as profitable subsidiaries should report lower profits. Empirically, their results suggest that MNEs are flexible enough to offset unanticipated subsidiary losses through transfer pricing, whereas debt shifting is a comparatively inflexible mechanism. In another concurrent study, De Simone, Klassen and Seidman (2017) investigate shift-to-loss strategies by interacting the differential tax rate of subsidiaries relative to all related firms with a loss dummy variable. Their results show that, in contrast to profitable subsidiaries, the profitability of loss-making subsidiaries responds positively to an increase in the tax rate differential vis-à-vis related firms. They interpret this finding as suggesting that lossmaking subsidiaries report smaller losses than otherwise predicted, consistently with the use of a shift-to-loss strategy.
Providing insight on the existence of tax-motivated shift-to-loss strategies, Hopland et al. (forthcoming) and De Simone et al. (2017) implicitly acknowledge that it is the marginal tax rates, rather than statutory profit tax rates, that shape income shifting incentives. However, neither of these studies explicitly approximates the marginal tax rate beyond a dichotomous distinction between profitable and unprofitable subsidiaries.
In the present study, we complement this concurrent research by employing sophisticated estimates of the marginal tax rate to capture income shifting incentives more accurately. Specifically, we employ firm-specific marginal tax rates (SMTR), simulated over a forecast stream of income according to the approach proposed by Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a,b; 1999) . Determining the current tax status over a forecast stream of income allows the analysis of a firm's loss carryback and carryforward opportunities.
Compared to static approaches, the SMTR has been shown to be the best proxy for the 'true' marginal tax rate (Graham, 1996a,b) . Evaluating its numerous empirical applications in corporate finance research, Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) provide evidence that the SMTR effectively overcomes the measurement error in tax incentives.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to assess the sensitivity of profit shifting to the marginal tax rate. Using the SMTR both as an alternative and as a complement to the statutory tax rate in our empirical model, we are able to explain MNEs' reactions both to the statutory tax environment and to subsidiaries' profit or loss positions. In other words, application of SMTR allows us to compare profit shifting to subsidiaries with low statutory tax rates and to subsidiaries with tax losses.
Using a panel of 23,668 foreign companies' EU subsidiaries in 20 countries over
2006-2013, we find that the shift-to-loss effect is statistically significant. Specifically, the marginal effect that variation in SMTR, including shift-to-loss incentives, exerts on reported earnings does not differ considerably from the marginal effect of low statutory profit tax rates. We interpret this finding as reflecting the fact that the shift-to-loss response, driven by the SMTR and not by the statutory tax rate, is similar in magnitude to the better empirically established response to profit-shifting incentives.
We utilise a sophisticated tax burden measure to further analyse the characteristics and determinants of the shift-to-loss effect. We observe that (a) profit shifting is most pronounced towards subsidiaries with low SMTRs that resulted from losses incurred over prior years rather than during the current year; (b) profits are shifted primarily to subsidiaries with loss carryforwards near expiration; (c) the shift-to-loss effect is temporary.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical approach and data. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4 presents the study's conclusions.
Empirical model and sample selection

Estimation approach
We employ the following fixed effects regression model: ĝapit = β0 + β1 taxit + β2 Ψit + β3 xjt + Φg + ρht + ε
The regression model is designed to avoid the potential endogeneity that would result from using profitability on the left-hand side and a tax measure, reflecting prior and expected future profitability on the right-hand side. Specifically, the dependent variable ĝap is defined as a direct measure of profits shifted to or out of subsidiary i in year t, which we estimate as realised return on assets (RoA) less (predicted) pre-shifting RoA.
The calculation of both ĝap and predicted pre-shifting RoA is described in detail in section 2.2.
The primary explanatory variable of interest is the firm-specific tax burden, denoted taxit. Regardless of the applied tax measure, i.e., the statutory tax rate or the simulated (true) marginal tax rate, ĝap is expected to increase if the tax burden declines.
In other words, if the MNE aims to reduce its overall tax payment, profits should be shifted to subsidiaries, facing the lowest marginal tax rates on incremental profit, regardless of whether such low tax rates result from the generally low host country statutory tax rate (STAXR) or from tax losses that may lower the SMTR below the statutory tax rate.
To isolate the effect of subsidiaries' loss positions on income shifting, i.e., to assess the tax rate sensitivity of shift-to-loss strategies, we split the marginal tax incentive to shift income into two principal components: the regressions we run include both the statutory profit tax rate to reflect the statutory tax environment and the difference between STAXR and SMTR to capture firm-specific deviations from the statutory tax rate that result, in particular, from current tax losses and intertemporal loss-offset opportunities.
The firm-specific SMTRs are computed according to the methodology developed by Shevlin (1990) and extended by Graham (1996a) and Graham and Kim (2009). 2 Following the approach of Graham (1996a) , who uses pre-financing SMTRs to explain corporate capital structures, we employ pre-shifting SMTRs calculated based on predicted RoA before income shifting. We use, first, SMTRs taking into account only intertemporal loss-offset rules (SMTRLO) and, second, enhanced simulation procedures that additionally consider group taxation regimes (SMTR).
Ψ is a vector of firm-specific variables that co-determine the profit-shifting activities, including the total assets and the total labour costs. We expect these variables to reflect the scale of economic activity at a given subsidiary. We furthermore take firm age into account, given that more mature firms may be better established in the marketplace than new entrants. Since all of these variables are highly skewed, we take natural logarithms.
Vector xjt consists of macroeconomic variables that reflect changes in external conditions, such as GDP per capita (GDPcapita), GDP growth (GDPgrowth) and market pressure, captured in our model by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). We expect companies to be more profitable in large and fast-growing economies. As a consequence, such companies are more likely to shift profits out of respective countries due to the companies' higher profit shifting potential. The HHI is a concentration measure, ranging from zero to one. Consistently with the European Commission, we calculate HHI by adding the squares of individual firms' market shares in our sample. 3 As HHI is highly skewed, we take its natural logarithm. We assume that companies in more competitive markets will have lower profit margins, with profit-shifting potential being relatively low.
Therefore, we expect HHI to have a negative coefficient in the regression.
Moreover, we include group fixed effects Φg to control for unobserved timeinvariant group characteristics. 4 A full set of industry-year effects 5 ρht is added to each of our specifications to control for year-and industry-specific shocks.
Simulation of expected pre-shifting profits and pre-shifting MTRs
We deviate from prior studies by employing returns instead of the logarithm of EBIT.
Through this approach, we are able to consider observations with positive or negative income figures and thus analyse adequately the expected "shift-to-loss" effect.
Both the firm's SMTR and our dependent variable ĝap, reflecting the amount of profit shifting, are based on the firm's predicted pre-shifting profits. As a practical matter, the pre-shifting profits cannot be obtained directly from published accounts. Therefore, we calculate pre-shifting profits using a three-step approach. The following Figures 1 and 2 visualise our methodological approach by calculating pre-shifting profits for a company, randomly chosen from our sample of over ten years of data.
At first, we calculate the firm's realised return (EBIT) on total assetst-1 less financial assetst-1 (RoA), shown by the black line in Figure 1 , and the asset-weighted profitability of comparable firms (the peer-group RoA), shown by the grey line in Figure   1 . Comparable firms are defined as standalone companies that operate in the same country and industry, as determined by the 4-digit NACE classification. We choose standalone companies as comparables because we expect them to show profits, mostly unaffected by profit-shifting activities due to having fewer profit-shifting options.
6
The profitability gap between RoA and the peer-group RoA is shown in Figure 1 and is expected to reflect two components: the structural profit shifting and the firmspecific profit volatility. We define structural profit shifting as the outcome of long-term shifting decisions accomplished, e.g., by establishing a tax-optimised internal transfer pricing system for regular transactions. Adjustments to such a system require substantial amounts of documentation and administrative efforts. For this reason, structural profit shifting is expected to be costly and long-term. Firm-specific profit volatility is expected to be the outcome of a firm's business risk and short term profit-shifting.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
During the second step, we eliminate structural profit-shifting from data and try to isolate firm-specific profit fluctuations. To this end, we compute the average RoA of firm i and the peer group RoA on a continuous basis (indicated by black and grey dashed lines in Figure 1 ). Continuous means that observations from year t1 up to the current year are included in the calculation. The resulting averages illustrate the long-lasting differences in profitability, referred to as the gap between the peer-group and the firm RoA. The long-term differences are indicated by the grey area in Figure 1 .
In the third step, the differences, interpreted as the long-term structural profit shifting component, are added back to firm i's realised RoA in each year t to obtain the firm's pre-shifting RoA shown in Figure 2 (indicated by the grey-shaded area). What remains is the individual firm volatility that includes short term profit-shifting, expected to respond to marginal shifting incentives reflected by the firm's SMTR.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The sequence of pre-shifting RoA values, determined in this manner, is used to predict future pre-shifting RoA values and pre-shifting SMTRs. The latter are simulated following the approach of Graham and Kim (2009) . 7 Finally, we compute the dependent variable ĝap as the difference of realised RoA and the predicted (simulated) pre-shifting RoA for each firm i and year t.
Data
Company data are taken directly from Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database, containing financial information and ownership data for European companies. Our regression sample is based on Amadeus release 259, covering medium-sized, large and very large European companies with accounting data for 2005-2015. We construct our estimation sample in the course of seven steps:
In the first step, we exclude firms with an "unknown" or "inactive" status, since
financial statements of such firms may be influenced by extraordinary items, rather than being driven by tax planning considerations. Due to differences in tax treatment of partnerships across jurisdictions, we consider only private and public limited companies in our analysis (step 2). Furthermore, we require unconsolidated financial statement data to test our hypothesis (step 3). Swedish companies are excluded, because Swedish tax rules differ substantially from rules of other European Union member states (step 4). 8 We also drop all companies that are not controlled by a parent company (step 5) or whose parent company is located in the same jurisdiction (step 6). This requirement ensures that firms are only considered if material international profit shifting incentives can be expected. Finally, we exclude all firms for which no SMTR could be simulated 9 (step 7), leading to the final sample of 23,668 subsidiaries with 85,466 firm-year observations for 2006-2013. The sample selection process is summarised in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 here]
The peer group sample is based on Amadeus data, covering the period from 1994
to 2013. The sample selection again follows steps 1-4, as described in Table 1 for the regression sample. However, we keep only stand-alone companies in the peer-group sample by dropping all companies with at least one controlling shareholder classified as industrial, insurance or financial company. Moreover, we drop companies held by the common individual controlling shareholder. After dropping all firm-year observations for which such basic financial information, as the total assets and EBIT, is not available, the remaining peer group sample consists of 5,751,153 firm-year observations. Allocation of firms to specific peer groups is made by year, country and 4-digit NACE code.
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Summary statistics for peer groups are reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 here] Summary statistics for our dependent and explanatory variables are shown in Table 12 (Table 13 ) in the appendix. marginal tax rates to assess tax incentives that drive profit shifting volumes reflected in ĝap. Specifications (2) and (3) use the most accurate version of the simulated marginal tax rate (SMTR), accounting for both inter-period loss-offset provisions and group tax regimes. Specifications (4) and (5) consider only the effect of inter-period loss-offset (SMTRLO). Accordingly, the first specification incorporates the marginal tax rate measure directly (i.e., in columns (2) and (4)), whereas the follow-up specification (columns (3) and (5)) considers separately the influence of STAXR and ΔSMTR (defined as SMTR -STAXR) to isolate the shift-to-loss effect more accurately.
Empirical analysis
Existence of a shift-to-loss effect
[Insert Table 3 here]
As expected, we find that profit shifting is significantly and negatively correlated with the simulated marginal tax rate (see Specification (2)). Using this more accurate estimate of the company tax burden might avoid attenuation bias in the resulting coefficients caused by measurement error.
11 If the statutory tax rate is used to assess the tax burden (Specification (1)), a coefficient of -.178 is estimated. The resulting effect magnitude, in absolute terms, is thus 6.9 percent smaller than the estimated effect of the SMTR (Specification (2)).
Decomposing SMTR into two components, STAXR and ΔSMTR, allows us to document the existence and estimate the magnitude of the shift-to-loss effect (Specification (3)). We observe that profit shifting is higher if companies face a marginal tax rate that falls, as a consequence of current or earlier losses, below the statutory tax rate (as demonstrated by the negative coefficient of ΔSMTR). In contrast to the binary approach of using a loss dummy (De Simone et al., 2017) , Specification (3) allows us to compare directly the size of the shifting response to statutory tax level and the shift-toloss effect by comparing the coefficients of the two components of the SMTR. If company managers are fully rational in responding to tax incentives, the coefficients of STAXR and ΔSMTR should not differ. This is because both a lower STAXR and a lower, by the same amount, SMTR result in the same amount of tax savings. We observe this to nearly be the case. In Specification (3), the estimated coefficient of ΔSMTR is -.193 (compared to .182 for the STAXR) and is thus even slightly higher.
To isolate responses to loss-offset regulations, in specifications (4) and (5), we use a less comprehensive version of the simulated marginal tax rate that reflects only the inter-period loss-offset rules while disregarding the effect of group tax regimes (SMTRLO). The shift-to-loss effect, as assessed by the coefficient of ΔSMTRLO in Specification (5), is smaller, but still statistically significant. Profit shifting to lossmaking firms is weaker if subsidiaries can offset their losses by way of a group tax regime.
We regard this finding as further evidence for application of highly sophisticated profitshifting techniques.
Characteristics and determinants of the shift-to-loss effect
The SMTR is a comprehensive and complex tax burden measure that reflects various financial influences (e.g., the current profit outlook, past and expected future profits, income volatility and the profit situation of other group companies) and tax code parameters (e.g., the statutory tax rate, the inter-period loss-offset regulations and the availability of a group tax regime). Consequently, low values of the simulated marginal tax rate may reflect the current year losses or prior years' losses that have not been offset so far. Large losses may have the same effect on the SMTR as small losses under very restrictive loss-offset regulations; a large temporary loss may have the same effect on the SMTR as small but persistent losses. We expect profit shifting behaviour to differ with different drivers of low marginal tax rates. For instance, we hypothesise that MNEs are particularly willing to avoid loss carry-forwards expiring due to time restrictions and thus respond particularly strongly to restrictive loss-offset provisions. We present regression results in this section that shed more light on how MNEs respond to low marginal tax rates depending on different firm-level drivers of the tax burden.
In Table 4 , Specification (1), we introduce a dummy variable Current Loss equal to 1 if the respective subsidiary reports a (pre-shifting) loss in the current year, and 0 otherwise. We interact Current Loss with ΔSMTRcen 12 to identify whether profit shifting responds more elastically to low marginal tax rates resulting from a current loss, or from unused loss carryforwards from prior years. The coefficient of ΔSMTRcen*Current Loss is significant and positive, implying that the response to low marginal tax rates is stronger,
i.e., more negative, if the marginal tax rate is reduced by unused loss carryforwards from prior years. This finding is remarkable, given that existing studies by De Simone et al.
(2017) and Hopland et al. (forthcoming) investigate only the effect of current year losses.
In Specification (2), we investigate the size of the shift-to-loss effect, depending on the restrictiveness of loss carryforward provisions. To this end, we distinguish between short-term (less than 10 years), mid-term (up to 18 years) and long-term loss carryforwards. 13 We expect that profit shifting to loss-making subsidiaries is particularly pronounced and sensitive to tax rate incentives, if losses can be carried forward in the subsidiary's country only for few years and MNEs thus face the risk that existing loss carry-forwards will expire in the (near) future. Consistently with this hypothesis, we find that profits are shifted in particular to subsidiaries with low marginal tax rates if loss carryforward regulations are very restrictive. The size of the shift-to-loss effect is almost twice as strong (-.298) for short-term loss carryforward periods as for long-term periods (-.163). MNEs thus seem to respond more strongly to probable expiration of loss carryforwards. In Specification (3), we investigate such situations more directly. To this end, we define a dummy variable Loss Expiration that captures observations where losses likely expire at the end of the current period. We assume this to be the case if a subsidiary's MTR increases sharply from a low value. 14 This situation is observed 558 times in our data. As expected, we find that profit shifting is more than twice as sensitive to tax incentives in such loss situations.
Specification (4) analyses further non-linear features of the response to low
marginal tax rates and considers a quadratic function of ΔSMTR. We convert the resulting coefficients into predictive margins for the shift-to-loss effect, pictured in Figure 3 . If the marginal effect of ΔSMTR were constant, we would expect a steadily rising predictive margin function. We find, however, that the function of the predicted shift-to-loss effect is inversely U-shaped with the maximum at ΔSMTR= SMTR -STAXR = -.225. The leftof-maximum part of the predicted shift-to-loss effect function thus signals MNEs' unwillingness to shift profits to highly unprofitable subsidiaries. We surmise this effect to be due to economic considerations, e.g., the higher insolvency risk.
[Insert Table 4 here] [Insert Figure 3 here] Finally, we investigate the persistence of tax incentives stemming from a low statutory tax rate and the existence of a loss carryforward. In particular, we test the theoretical prediction that statutory tax rates determine long-term profit shifting strategies, as changes in statutory tax rates over time are small. In contrast, profit shifting strategies responding to the existence of a loss carryforward, i.e., the previously mentioned shift-to-loss-effect, are expected to reflect the intention to ensure a short-term offset of losses. Loss carryforwards should thus affect profit shifting only in the short run.
This expectation is tested with additional regression analyses, with results reported in Table 5 . In Specifications (2) and (3), we replace tax variables (STAXR, ΔSMTR) by their one-and two-year lags, respectively. 15 Our findings indicate that, as expected, the lagged values of the statutory tax rate exercise a constant influence, whereas the influence of loss carryforward is considerably smaller if ΔSMTR is included via its one-year lagged value (-.168, Specification (2)) or its two-year lagged value (-.101, Specification (3)). We obtain similar findings if we include current-year and lagged variables in the same regression and determine the cumulative (long-run) effect in accordance with Wooldridge (2016) . 16 Again, the tax rate exercises a constant (long-run) effect, whereas the influence of ΔSMTR diminishes over time.
Results from intermediate regressions, designed to capture particular long-term effects, point in the same direction (see Specifications (4) and (5)). Whereas Specification (4) finds a statistically significant effect for the statutory tax rate, SMTR displays only a very small effect. This finding supports our interpretation that the effect of loss carryforwards is only short-term.
[Insert Table 5 here] Table 6 reports regression results for different sub-samples. In Specifications (1)- (3), the sample is split depending on the location of the ultimate parent company. We find that subsidiaries of US multinationals respond considerably stronger to tax incentives (Specification (2)) than foreign subsidiaries of EU-multinationals (Specification (1)).
Group characteristics and the shift-to-loss effect and robustness tests
This difference does not necessarily imply that US multinationals generally engage in more aggressive tax optimisation. One may also argue that the geographic distance between the parent and the subsidiary locations and the ensuing weaker emotional bonds with the subsidiary location serves as an explanation for this finding. However, a similar effect is not observed for other non-EU multinationals (Specification (3)).
In Specification (4), we investigate whether the shift-to-loss effect depends on the MNE's current profit situation. We add a dummy variable, namely, the MNE Loss, that distinguishes between profitable and loss-making MNEs. We compute the sum of profits and losses of subsidiaries of an MNE in year t, excluding the profit or loss of the observed firm i. If the sum is negative, the value of MNE Loss is 1; it is 0 otherwise. By construction, the analysis requires at least two firm-year observations per MNE. As a result, we obtain a sample of 58,474 firm-year observations, of which 9.78% belong to a loss-making group. The results reported here reveal that the shift-to-loss effect is considerably smaller (by approximately 40 percent) if the overall MNE is profitable during the current period. Profitable MNEs may be less interested in efficient use of loss carryforwards and may be more sensitive to statutory tax rates.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The validity of analysis performed in this paper depends critically on quality of our profit shifting measure (ĝap), which is directly affected by the forecast future returns from the simulation of SMTRs. To validate the quality of the simulation forecast, we determine, on a yearly basis, the correlation between simulated (predicted) pre-shifting RoAs and calculated pre-shifting RoAs. 17 Resulting correlations are between .38 and .52. 18 We therefore conclude that using predicted pre-shifting RoAs has its merits, since it helps capture a sizable portion of firm-specific variance in profitability unrelated to profit-shifting activities. To assess the quality of profit-shifting identification, we regress pre-shifting returns on STAXR and find no significant influence (see Table 7 ,
Specification (1)). This finding supports our assumption that, at least on average, the influence of profit-shifting is successfully eliminated in the course of calculating preshifting profits. Table 7 also reports the results of a number of further robustness tests. Our main finding for the impact of the marginal tax rate is consistent for samples that exclude periods of financial crisis or observations from the largest country (Specifications (4) and (5)). Furthermore, using a number of alternative definitions of the dependent variable (Specifications (6) to (8)) leads to no material differences.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Conclusion
Ample empirical literature has documented multinationals' profit response to tax differentials. It is only recently, however, that studies of income shifting to loss-making subsidiaries began to appear. In this respect, the theory-based expectation is that profitshifting incentives should be assessed based on the company's true marginal tax rate, rather than the statutory tax rate. In other words, if an MNE aims to reduce its overall tax payment, profits should be shifted to subsidiaries facing the lowest marginal tax rates on incremental profit, regardless of whether such low tax rates result from a generally low host country statutory tax rate or from tax losses (see, e.g., Hopland et al. (forthcoming) ).
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to assess the tax sensitivity of profit shifting to the marginal tax rate. Using SMTR both as an alternative and as a complement to the statutory tax rate in our empirical specifications, we are able to provide evidence on MNEs' reactions both to the statutory tax environment and to subsidiaries' specific profit or loss positions. In other words, application of SMTR allows us to identify the elasticity of profit shifting to subsidiaries featuring low statutory tax rates and, in addition, to isolate the effect of tax losses. Using a panel of 23,668 EU subsidiaries of foreign companies, we find that the shift-to-loss effect is significant and that the size of this effect (marginal effect: -.162) does not differ considerably from shifting to low-tax rates (marginal effect: -.189). Examining in more detailed the drivers of loss-related low marginal tax rates, we find that MNEs respond particularly strong in situations where loss carry-forwards may expire in the near future. Definitions of all other variables are given in Table 12 and 13 in the appendix. A constant is calculated but not reported. 
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